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VANGETJ

v.

[51 C.2d

VANGEL

minor matter
or direct the commission to
any technical errors of this type in its order.
In my
the order of the commission should be afexcept insofar as concerns the possible technical errors
referred to above.
concurred.
of
Public 1Jtilities Commission for
was denied March 4, 1959. Gibson, C. J., and
were of the
that the petition should be

A. Ko. 24725.

In Bank.

Feb. 3, 1959.]

NICK VANGEL et al., Respondents, v. CHARI,ES
VANGEL, Appellant.
[1] Appeal-Law of Case-Matters Concluded.-Where the Supreme
on a former appeal, held that a retiring partner
was not limited to 23.96 per cent of post-dissolution profits
because the contribution of his services in managing a ranch
had not been taken into consideration, but did not say that
this figure was incorrect as applied by the trial court to the
inclusion of certain items in the partners' capital accounts,
he may not as:;ert, on a subsequent appeal, that the 23.96 per
cent
vms
since this matter was res judicata.
[2] Id.-Law of Case-Matters Concluded.-A partner who was
found to have
caused the dissolution of a partnership may not assert on appeal that the trial court erred in
the sanctions expressed in Corp. Code, § 15038 (2b),
where this was held to be correct and proper on a former
appeal.
[3] Partnership -Liquidation- Subsequent Profits.-Where the
business of a ranch partnership was continued after dissolution with the
of a retiring partner, he was not entitled,
pending an
to share in an amount he claimed to be
the present value
the ranch, based on the supposition that
because
its location the ranch would in the future have

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d,
Appeal and
§ 98;") et
See Cal.Jur.2d,

§ 685 et seq.; Am.Jur.,

§ 120.
Appeal and Error, § 1350; [3-6]
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that value for subdivision
placed on the ranch
the
tion was definitiYe of that
relating to rights of a
is continued, provides that
the date of dissolution" shall be
(4] !d.-Liquidation-Subsequent Profits.-Where the business of
a ranch partnership was continued after dissolution with the
assets of a retiring partner and he withdrew part of the total
sum due him for his partnership
no
were due
him for the use of such assets after they
deposited
to his order; he was entitled only to profits on the balance of
his interest in the ranch, and where the trial court in its sound
judgment, aided by the reports of several
accountants,
determined that such partner's share
the post-dissolution
profits amounted to a certain sum on a designated "cut-off"
date, such determination, in the absence of judicial error,
should not be disturbed on appeal.
[5] !d.-Liquidation- Subsequent Profits.-A retiring partner's
right to participate in the post-dissolution profits of a citrus
ranch partnership was not improperly terminated as of May
12, 1953, where it appeared that he was allowed profits on
the 1952-1953 citrus crop to October 13,
which would be
the latest date that any profits could have accrued from his
interest in the partnership property.
[6] !d.-Liquidation-Subsequent Profits.-A partner who was
found to have wrongfully caused dissolution of the partnership and who, after the innocent partners were permitted to
continue the partnership business with his assets, elected to
take profits rather than interest on the value of his share in
the partnership, could not successfully argue that he could not
be put to an election between interest and profits until the
amount due him had been
settled, nor successfully
claim that he was entitled to interest on the amount found
due him until the amount was either paid or made available
to him.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for dissolution of a partnership.
plain tiffs affirmed.

J udgrnent for

Pacht, Ross, "\Varne & Bernhard, Isaac Pacht and Harvey
M. Grossman for Appellant.
Harold l\L Heimbaugh and George W. Rochester for Respondents.

Gl~
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C.AH'l'ER .I.---Defendant, Charles Vani-!·c1, appeals from
a j1Hlgment ent<•red in an ad.ion instiinted in April, Hl.fG, by
plaintiffs, Nick and EnH'st Vangel, for dissolution of' a partnership. 'l'he ease has now been tried four times and this
appeal iN from the judgment PllterPd a ftPr the fourth trial.
CVnnuel Y. Vangel, 116 Cal.App.2d 615 [254 P.2cl 91Dj;
Vangel v. Vanuel, 45 Cal.2d 804 [291 P.2d 25, 55 A.L.R.2d
1385].)
In May, 1944, Nick, Ernest and Charles VangPl, brothers,
entered into an agreement for the purchase and operation of
a 360-aere eitrus raneh. 'l'he agreement provided that title
was to be taken in the indiYidual namrs of the three brothers,
eaeh of whom was to contribute his pro rata share of the pnrdmsr priee and eaeh to own a one-third interest in the ranch.
'l'he purchase of the raneh was eonsunnnated for $340,000,
with a down payment of $120,000. Charles was unable to pay
his full share of the down payment and borrowed $25,000
from Nick and Ernest to make up his share of $40,000.
After operations had commenced a dispute arose among the
brothers >Yhieh culminated in an adion by Nick and Ernest
to dissolYe the partnership. Inasmuch as our decision here
must necessarily turn upon a construction of the opinion
renclrred by the District Court of Appeal in Vangel v. Vangel,
116 Cal.App.2d 615 [254 P.2d 919], and by this court on
Deeember 23, 1955, ·we will set forth in some detail the pertinent portions thereof. Unless otherwise noted, the emphasis
is hrrr added. In Vangel v. Vangel, 45 Cal.2d 804, 806, 807,
808, 809, 810 [291 P.2d 25, 55 A.L.R2d 1385], we held: "By
the prior judgment, a dissolution was deereed effeetive as of
June 15, 1950. The eourt found that Charles wrongfully
eaused the dissolution and concluded that Nick and Ernest
were privileged to purchase his interest. The ya]ue of the
raneh was fixed at $235,000, and a finding was made as to
the Yalue of Charles' interest in the partnership. According
to another finding, he was entitled to participate in profits
aceruing between the date of dissolution and ,January 1, 1951.
"Upon the prior appeal [Va11[!el v. Vangel, 116 Cal.App.
2d 615 (254 P.2d 919)], findings as to the Yalue of the ranch
property and Charles' fault in causing the disRolution were
approved. It was held that the trial jndge pl'opeTly allowed
the plaintiffs to purchase Charles' 'inleTest, but that he erred
1'n failing to inclncle certain ·items in his val1wfion of it.
Purthermore, said the District Court of Appeal, the rigl!t of
Charles to participate in profits accunmlated by joint use of
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334 p .2d 8631

assets should not have been
of
it
tencl so as to include the
matured and soon
left to the sound
matters, the judgment was reversed with directions for an
accounting.
of the ram:h
"'l'he amounts of
elaims
after dissolution of
not now
and advances, as determined upon the
disputed. The value of Charles' interest in the
the time of dissolution based upon those amounts,
court
to be :23.96 per cent of the partnership net ·worth.
also declared that Charles is entitled to that
of the profits
the
the ranch
tween the elate of dissolution and the
up of the partnerslu:p affairs. Another findi11g is that 'whatever services
defendant may have rendered toward the condud of the
partnen;hip affairs, from the date of the dissolution of the
partnership . . . 1vas voluntary on his part and against the
wishes and directions of the plaintifi's.'
"The judgment gives Nick and Ernest, inta alia, the right
to purchase Charles' interest in the partnership for its value
as determined at tbe retrial, plus interest on that mnount
ft·mn September 8, 1.953. Charles is allowed 23.96 per cent
of the profits aceruing prior to that date and the same percentage of ceetain proc-eeds from sales of erops. He is denied
any wages
sen·iccs
the dissolution
tbe
partrwrshJp and must pay 23.96 prr rent of the audit.
''Charles contends that the trial
erred in his computations of the ya!ues at the time of the dissolutiou, o£ the
respective partner~hip interests and of the partners' shares
o£ the profits aerrning between dissolution and the wiuding
up of the partnership affairs. He also challenges the finding
that his post-dissolution serviees were 'voluntary' and 'against
the wishes and direetions of the plaintiffs' as being wii hout
support in the evidenee. Finally, he eoutends that he should
not have been taxed any of the costs of condueting the audit
upon tlJe retrial.
"With regard to the value of the partnership interests,
Charles argues that the trial judge erred in including in the
partners' capital aceounts items which properly are personal
obligations of the partners inter sese. He objeds particularly
1, 1951. That

51 C.2d-17
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to the indusion of an item of
advanced to him
the
other partners upon the purehase of the
and another
one of $42,000, which his brothers assertedly withdrew improperly from partnership funds.
"Upon the former appeal, however, it was held that these
items were, respeetively, an obligation owing to the partnership and a distribution of profits. By ineluding those items
in his eomputations of the values of the partners' interests
in the partnership, the trial judge followed the mandate of
the Distriet Court of Appeal: 'In ascertaining such interest
not only is the value of the raneh to be eonsidered as of that
date [June 15, 1950] as well as other capital assets, liabilities
and expenses, but also the claims whieh the partnership had
against the brothers ancl their set-offs among themselves should
have been eompnted as of June 15, 1950, with interest to that
time.' (Emphasis added, 116 Cal.App.2d 629-630.) The court
further said 'in determining the respective financial interests
in the partnership business as of that date consideration must
be given to the $25,000 whieh plaintiffs advanced for defendant, and to the $42,000 which plaintiffs improperly withheld
and distributed, together with interest on said sums to date
of dissolution. All other assets and liabilities of the partnership, together with any claims of the parties inter se, must be
included in the ascertainment of the respective interests of
the plaintiffs and the defendant.'
"In attacking the portion of the judgment lin1iting him
to 23.96 per cent of the post-dissolution profits, Charles has
presented several theories as justifying a larger amount. It is
1mnecessary to conside1· all of thern, however, becanse the computation of his share was made upon an erroneous basis.
"Upon the former appeal it was held that the trial judge
was correct in concluding that the partnership had been dissolved by reason of Charles' breach of the partnership agreement and that the remaining partners had exercised their
privilege of continuing the partnership business. (Corp. Code,
§ 15038, subd. (2b).) In that situation, Charles was entitled
to haYe computed the value of his interest in the partnership,
exelusive of his share of the good will of the business, and less
any damages caused to his copartners. (Corp. Code, § 15038,
subd. (2e II).) For the use of his partnership assets in the
continuing business, pending a settlement of the aeeounts, he
was entitled to receive 'as an ordinary creditor an amount
equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved partnership
with interl'~st, or, at his option . . . in lieu of interest, the

Feb. 1959]
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profits attributable to the use
his right in the property
of the dissolved partnership.' (Emphasis added; Corp. Code,
§ 15042.) Said the District Court of Appeal, 'Prom the position dcf enrlant has taken on this
it is fair to say that
he has elected to take
mther than interest on the value
of his share
the
' (116 Cal.App.2d 629.)
'' 'rbe record
the rather unusual situation of a
partner, expelled from the partnership for cause and by
juditial
to participate with l1is former
partners in the operation and management of the business.
Charles contends that he is entitled to receive compensation
for serviees so performed. In reply, his brothers rely upon
the finding that his post-dissolution services were voluntary
and against their wishes. However, the evidence does not
support that finding. It appears that Charles continued to
participate in the business in substantially the same manner
as before the action for dissolution. 'l'here is no evidence of
any protest by his brothers. On the contrary, they appear
to have acquiesced fully in his continuing services.
''Section 15042 of the Corporations Code fixes the right of
one retired from a partnership for cause, or the personal representative of a deceased partner, to recover compensation
for the use of his assets in the continuing business pending
an accounting. In such case, he is entitled to 'the profits
attributable to the use of his right in the property.' As a
practical matter, his share of the profits usually is computed
on the basis of the ratio that his share of the partnership assets
bears to the whole of them. [Citations.] However, that
division may not be equitable when the contribution to profits
from eapital is relatively minor in comparison to the contribution from the skills or services of one conducting the business.
In such a cm;e, the managing partner may be entitled to a
greater share of the profits. [ CitatioHs.] Although such a
method of dividing profits is usually spoken of in terms of
providing extra compensation for the managing ex-partner,
in reality it merely reflects the statutory requirement that
the retired or dcecased partner be allowed the profits attributable to his right in the assets used in the business.
"..\ro California ease eonsidcrs the right to compensation
for serviees in a continuing lmsiness of one whose fanlt has
caused t lle dissolntion of tlw part1wrship. 'l'he authorities
in other jnrisdidion nre in eonfliet. [Citations.] 'l'hose whieh
deny rPcove1·y f!:enerally proeeed upon a theory similar to
the unclean hands principle; most of the decisions whieh allow
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upon the principle that one who seeks
case th c balance
based npon
here shown is one
and skill

the
favors the
services rendered. The
which involves a conin the cnlt1:vation anrl
it woulrl be inhis services when

[plaintiffs] take the position, however,
that profits be apportioned according
to the values of the partnership interests without compensation to Charles for his post-dissolution seniees is the law of
the rase as established in "Vangel v. "Vangel, supra. It is unnecessary to pass upon this contention. 'The doetrine of the
law of the ease is reeognized as a harsh one . . . and the
modern view is that it should 110t be adhered to when the
applieation of it results in a mauifestly unjust decision.'
v. Hospital of Good Samaritan, 14 Cal.2d 791, 795
[97 P.2d 813].) Bven if the tleeision upon the formrr appeal he construed as limiting the apportionment of profits
in the manner suggested, it would be unjust to do so, and the
deeision should not be followed to that extent.
"1'he judgment,
as it determines the value of the
partnership interests and the total amount of post-clissolution
to be distributc(l among the ex-partners, is based
upon findings wh1:ch arc supported by substantial evidence.
II ow ever, those
arc divided sol ely upon the basis of
the relative L'alucs
the
interests ·in the partnership
The amomd of profits attributable to the use
of Charles' share of the asscsts [sic] and also those allocable
to his services in the continuing b?isincss should have been
considered in the apportionment.
"No error is shown in the award of: costs. A proeeeding to
dissolve and liquidate a partnership is controlled by equitable
principlPs [eitations] and the trial judge has a broad disc-retion in fixing costs
reversed 1cith directions to the trial
accordance with this opinion, the reto 1chich each partner is cnt,itlcd.
In all other
the Judgment 1:s
'rhe eosts upon
1 his appeal shall be divided equally between the appellant
and the respondents.''

Feb.
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DmECTIONS
\VE Ih:l,IJ (in addition to what had theretofore been adjurlicated) :
1. That Charles ~was entitled to a share of the post-dissolution profits attributable to the use of his share of the partnership assets.
2. That Charles was entitled to compensation for his services in the continuing business.
3. That Charles was not limited to 23.96 per cent of the
post-dissolution profits because the contribution of his services in managing the ranch had not been taken into con:,;ideration.
'l'he 23.96 percentage was achieved in this way:
PARTNERS' CAPITAL: Gross assets of partnership (~with value
of partnership real
improvements and supplies fixed at
$235,000) less gross liabilities.
Balance, at
Nick
Ernest
Charles
Total
33% per
cent each
$67,611.98 $67,611.99 $67,611.99 $202,835.96
Adjustments-Liability of Charles Vangel
to Nick and Ernest Vangel in the amount
of $25,000, plus interest at 7 per een:
from April 16, 1945 to June 15, 1950
17,021.23
17,021.23 ( 34,042.46)
Liability of Nick and Ernest Vangel to
Charles Vangel in amount of $14,000
(% of $42,000), plus interest at 7 per
cent from May 27, 1949 to June 15, 1950
(7,515.51) (7,515.51) 15,031.02
Financial
interests $77,117.70
Interest in
percentages 38.02%
38.02%
23.96%
After onr decision, upon the retrial, the court found:
1. That this court affirmed the 23.96 per cent figure, both
as to the former partnership interests and the post-dissolution
profits from June 15, 1950, the adjudged dissolution date,
''to and including the 1953 crops harvested and unharvested,
the cut-off date being May 12, 1953." (Finding III.)
2. That defendant's interest in the value of the ranch, at
the time of dissolution, on the basis of 23.96 per cent was
found by Judge Vickers to be $37,440.45; that this figure
was affirmed by this court. (Finding IV.)

SuMMARY oF
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'l'hat defendant
at the datP or <lissolut ion of t h(·
I was]
$4R,GOO.:J:J. (Finding IY.)
4. 'l'hat drfen<lant';.; inlen'st in
iion profits from
,J nne 15, 1950, to May 12, J 97)8 ''the terminal elate found by
,Judge Vickers and affirmed by the Supreme Court" amounted
to $4G,849.8:J. (I''inding IV.)
5. That certain monies had been paid to plaintiffs subse.
qnent to May 12, 1953. and up to Oetober 13, 1953, and that
defendant's interest therein was $9,024.7 4. (Pinding IV.)
6. 'J'hat the "total of Defendant's interest 'attributable
to the use of Charles' (Defendant) share of assets' in the
former partnership is $140,915.18." (Pin <ling IV.)
7. That Charlrs had ·withdrawn from the total sum of
$140,915.13 the sum of $81,999.45, leaving a balance due
him of $58,915.G8 (this latter sum is exclusive of the com·
pen;;;ation found to be due to defendant as will hereinafter
appear). (.B'inding VI.)
8. That Charles had not been the exclusive manager and
supervisor of the ranch; that ''much'' of what defendant did
was over the protest of the plaintiffs and not with their
"full acquiescence"; that defendant's services were of the
management type and not that of a mere rmployee; that the
post-dissolution services rendered by defendant were from
June 15, 1950, to NoYember 10, 1958; that defendant rendered
no services thereafter. (.B'inding VII, in part.)
9. "That it is true the value of services for managing and
superYising a citrus ranch the size of the cultivated portion
of the Cascade Raneh is from $198.75 to $238.50 a month.
'l'he court finds that the services of Defendant are worth on the
average not to exceed $200 a month for the prriod from
June 15, 1950, to November 10, 1958, or a total amount of
$8,200.00." (Pin ding VII.)
10. It was provided that because of a stipulation entered
into between the parties, defendant was to pay 28.96 per
cent of $1,950 charged by an accountant employed by the
parties. ( l<'incling VIII.)
Charles contends that the trial court erred in terminating
his right to profits as of May 12, 1953. In subheading 4,
just set forth, we pointrd out that Finding IV is to the
effect that Judge Vicker's finding of the terminal date as
?,l[ay 12, 1953, was affirmed by this court. There is no such
affirmation. In commenting upon the decision of the District
Court of Appeal in Vangel v. Vangel, 116 Cal.App.2d 615

Feh.1959]

VANGEL V. VANGEL

519

[51 C.2d 510; 334 P.2d 863]

[254 P.2d
, vvc said that Charles' right to participate
in post-dissolution profits "should not have been terminated
as of January 1, 1931. That period, it vvas determined, should
extend so as to include the proee0ds from fruit substantially
matured and soon ready for marketing, the final date to be
left to the sound judgment of the ebaneellor."
v
Vangel, 43 Cal.2d
806
P.2d
55 A.L.R.2d
.)
In a memorandum ruling
B'ebruary 4, 1957, by Judge
Clarence .M. Hanson it is stated: "The findings of Judge
Vickers, earricd into the judgment he rendered, granted to
the defendant 23.96 per cent of the value of the partnership
property ($235,000) as of the date of dissolution on June 15,
1950, plus 23.96 per cent of the post-dissolution profits from
,Juno 15, 1950, to and including the 1953 crops harvested
and unharve:o;ted on 1VIay 12, 1953, but as he did not include
anything for the serviees render0d by the defendant from
June 15, 1950, to that date, the judgment was reversed with
instructions to ascertain the amount. The Supreme Court did
not suggest that the cnt-off date 'lDas to be irlay 12, 1953, but
that is probably what it had in mind. II owever, if a later date
should be proper, as the defendant emltc11ds, it may not ,in any
event go beyond N ovcmbcr 10, 1953 . . . . " 'l'he memorandum
opinion then sets forth part of an affidavit signed by Charles
wherein he states he has done uo work on the ranch subsequent to .1\owmber 10, 1953. November 10, 1953, was apparently the date judgment was entered afier the third trial.
In the alternative, Charles argues that if he is not entitled
to a share of the profits subsequent to May 12, 1953, that he
is eutitled to interest on the balance c:llw him as of that date.
Section 15042 of the Corporations Code provides that a partner
in Charles' position is entitled to "an amount equal to the
value of l1is interest in the dissolved partnership" or "In
lieu of interest the profits attributable to the use of his right
in the property of the dissolved partnership." The District
Court of Appeal noted (116 Cal.App.2c1 629) that "From
the position defendant has taken on this appeal it is fair to
say that he has elected to take profits rather than interest
on the 'l)aluc of his share of the partnership." (See also
Vangel v. Vanucl, 45 Cal.2cl 804, 808 [291 P.2d 25, 55 A.I1.R
2d1385].)
By Chari es' own admission, he pedormed no scrviees after
November 10, 1963, the date on which the trial court terminated any right to compensation for services. He does argue
that his services had been found, on a prior trial, to be worth
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per month as
him on the instant trial.
evidence was adduced at the
the judgment of which is
now under
aw:l that there is ample evidence in
the record to substantiate the trial court's finding that
Charles' scrviees were worth $200 per month, or a total
amount of
[1] Charles argues,
he has done
per cent
is incorrect and seeks to
the disposition of the two items of
and $42,000 which were
116 Cal.App.2d 615,
, and in
v. ·vangel, 45 Cal.2d
55 A.L.R.2d 1385]. We did not say,
804, 807
in the latter ease, that the 23.96 per cent figure was incorrect
because of the disposition of the two amounts, but that
Charles' share of the post-dissolution profits was incorrect
because his
to compensation had not been taken into
consideration. There is no merit to this contention inasmuch
as the matter is res judicata.
[2] 'fhcre is no merit to Charles' contention that the
trial court erred in applying the provisions of section 15038,
subdivision
of the Corporations Code. This was held
to be correct and proper in Yangel v. Yangel, 116 Cal.App.2d
615, 628 [254 P.2d 919], and reaffirmed by this court in
Vangel v. Yangel, ·15 Cal.2d 804, 808 [291 P.2d 25, 55 A.L.R.
2d
[3] There
no merit to Charles' eontention that he is
entitled to share in what he claims is the present value of the
ranch, the sum of $2,000,000. His claim is based on his
argument that because of the location of the ranch it will have
that value for subdivision purposes. In Vangel v. Yangel,
116 Cal.App.2d 615, 633 [254 P.2d 919], the court noted
that the valuation of $235,000 placed on the ranch by the
trial court at the date of dissolution of the partnership was
''definitive of that question.'' Furthermore, section 15042
of the Corporations Code provides that the retiring partner's
interest "at the date of dissolution" shall be ascertained.
(See Vangel v.
116 Ca1.App.2d 6]5, 627, 628, 629
.)
[254 P.2d
[4] Plaintiffs argue that the sum of $38,090.45 ($37,440.45
plus $650
has been available to Charles since September 10, 1953. This statement is substantiated by the record.
Charles' Bxhibit ''A.,'' the Pritkin, Finkel and Company Aceountants' Report, page 2, shows such deposits in escrow to
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Plaintiffs also
out that the amount
,115.68) after the fourth
has been
:3, Hl53. The record shows (Charles' Exhibit "A") that from the $38,090.45 deposited in
Charles has withdrawn the sum of $6,982.10. The rerord
also shows
refiecti~d in the
that Charles had
made other withdrawals in the sum of $75,017.35.* It was
then found that Charles had a balance due him of $58,915.68
the sum of $8,200 as compensation for his services, maka total due Charles of $67,115.68, which has been deposited in escrow to Charles' account since May, 1957. It
appears to us that the trial court correctly carried out the
mandate of the District Court of Appeal and that of this
court and that there has been no error. After the amounts
due Charles as his original share of the partnership assets
had been deposited to his order, it is obvious that no profits
were due him from the use of such assets. Charles' interest
in the real property had been adjudged to be $37,440.45; his
interest as of ,June 15, 1950 (the date of dissolution), is shown
by his Rxhibit ''A'' to be $48,600.55; his share of the postdissolution profits from June 15, 1950 to May 12, 1953, as
shown by Charles' Exhibit "A" amount to $45,849.39; and
his share of the profits on the 1952-1953 crop whic~h was apparently harvested by October 13, 1953, amount to $9,024.74,
or a total balance of $140,915.13. Charles' withdrawals from
this amount have been heretofore set forth. It will be recalled
that in Vanoel v. Vangel, 116 Cal.App.2d 615, 630 [254 P.2d
919], it was held that Charles should be entitled to his share
of the proceeds of a "erop substantiall.v matured and soon
ready for market. \Vhile no formula or precise definition can
br laid down to determine when such fruit has substantiall;'
matured, this determination can properly be left to the sound
judgment of the chancellor." As heretofore noted, there was
no petition for hearing after that decision, and our opinion in
Vanoel v. Vangel, 45 Ca1.2d 804 [291 P.2d 25, 55 A.hR.2d
1385], did not disturb that holding. While we did not, as
found by the trial eourt during i his trial, approve May 12,
1953, as a "cut-off" date, we did not hold otherwise and
reversed only for the purpose of allowing Charles compensation for his post-disso1 ntion managerial efforts on behalf
of tiw partnership. Since the trial court has here, in its sound
'"It appears from a letter written by Judge Hanson, dated April 11,
19G7, to the attorneys of record, that defendant Charles had received
this sum d i reetly from the partnership.

C'.2<1

judgment, aided by the reports of sevm·al rpmlified aeeounlants determined that Charles' interests arc as have bec•n heretofore set forth, and since there has heen no judleial error,
there appears to be no reason to disturb its judgment.
[5] From what has just been said it is dear that there
is no merit to Charles' contention that his right to participate
in the partnership profits should not have been terminated
as of 1\'Iay 12, 1953, since it appears from the record that he
was allmved profits on the 1952-1953 crop to October 13, 195~~,
which would be the latest date that any profits could have
acerued from his interest in the partlwrship real property. As
heretofore set forth, Charles' share of the value of the partnership real property was deposited in escrow to his account on
September 10, 1953.
[6] Charles also argues that he cannot be put to an election
between interest and profits until the amount due him has
been finally settled. This argument stems from the statement
made by the District Court of Appeal, 116 Cal.App.2d 615,
630, that since the accounts of the partnership had not been
"properly settled . . . he was not required to accept the
offer made to purchase his share after the rendition of final
judgment, since the accounting should have proceeded 'upon
different principles than did the accounting which was actually taken.' (Nuland v. Pruyn, supra [99 Cal.App.2d 603
(222 P.2d 261)])." The same court pointed out, however,
that "From the position defendant has taken on this appeal
it is fair to say that he has elected to take profits rather than
interest on the val1w of his share in the partnership.'' ( 116
Cal.App.2d 615, 629.)
Charles also claims that he is entitled to interest on the
amount found to be due him until that amount is either paid,
or made available to him. From what has been heretofore
said it is obvious that there is no merit to this argument.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J., concurred.

